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Analogical transfer of experience and the misuse of diversification 
 
Abstract 
 
When the payoff function is convex, diversification can be the wrong strategy for 
dealing with risky choices. We constructed two experimental settings in which it is 
stochastically dominant not to diversify. Nevertheless, subjects inappropriately 
preferred the diversification strategy. A de-biasing treatment suggests that this 
diversification fallacy may be interpreted as the outcome of the analogical transfer of 
decision heuristics learned in more usual domains. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Diversification is an effective investment strategy for dealing with risky alternatives; still, 
putting the eggs in different baskets can be sometimes a misleading heuristic. Diversification 
seeks to minimize risk (typically, return variance) by splitting investment  in different types of 
imperfectly correlated assets. While the portfolio mean return is just the weighted  average of 
assets returns,  it is a statistical fact that when asset returns are imperfectly correlated,  the 
portfolio variance   is less than the weighted mean of assets variances.  Thus, variance averse  
individuals  can exploit this feature to compose diversified portfolios that reduce variance 
whilst  preserving mean return.  The concept of diversification is very intuitive: in Markovitz 
words, it is “both observed and sensible; a rule of behavior which does not imply the 
superiority of diversification must be rejected  both as a hypothesis and as a maxim” 
(Markovitz, 1952). 
However, there are also cases in which faith in “the superiority of diversification” turns out to 
be a source of error. Generally speaking, the relationship between variability and investment 
is ambivalent, depending on the payoff function of investment. If the payoff function is 
convex in some random variables, then a mean preserving larger variability will increase the 
return to investment due to Jensen’s inequality, while when the payoff function is concave the 
variance of the random variables discourages investment. Concave payoffs prevail when 
irreversible investments make returns to investment asymmetric (Bernanke, 1983; Pindyck, 
1988). On the other hand, convex returns prevail when  the investment process is 
characterized by some kind of flexibility, such as the flexibility of labor relative to capital 
(Abel 1983), the option to abandon a project (Roberts and Weissman, 1981), the limited 
liability rule truncating the downside risk for shareholders (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).  In all 
these cases, risk neutral or risk averse individuals are better off choosing the alternative with 
the highest variability. 
Remarkably, almost all empirical studies found a negative relationship between investment 
and uncertainty, as the comprehensive review by Carruth et al. shows (Carruth et al., 2000). 
This might be explained by the simple fact that irreversibility factors prevail in all the 
empirical settings analyzed, which are primarily, but not exclusively (see for instance Guiso 
and Parigi, 1996), US manufacturing firms. Yet, the almost universal absence of positive 
relationships might reflect a behavioral bias.  Decision makers might transfer the decision 
rules appropriate to the  most common conditions of irreversibility also to decisions where the 
opposite conditions prevail. According to such behavioral interpretation, decision makers 
might invariably react negatively to uncertainty because they are prey to the faith in “the 
superiority of diversification”.  
Our explanation is consonant with the theory of “fast and frugal heuristics” (Gigerenzer and 
Todd, 1999), which suggests the existence of a “toolbox” of (cognitively efficient) decision 
rules that individuals apply to specific domains. Those rules are well adapted to the prevailing 
structure of the domain, but may turn out to be suboptimal when structure is different. In our 
case, a diversification rule is effective in the domain of risky choice in most common 
environments, but fails when the payoff structure is convex. This is also in accordance with 
theories of human decision making that emphasize that when dealing with new or complex 
problems individuals tend to resort to past experience and analogy processes in their search 
for solutions.  For example, case based decision theory (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1995) 
postulates that we tend to weigh the success of past choices by their similarity with current 
decision problems  to select the most promising alternatives.  
In what follows, we construct two experimental settings in which the structure of the decision 
problem is such that it is stochastically dominant not to diversify. The two experimental 
settings are different in surface, but share the same structure. The first experimental setting 
presents a very simple  decision setting in which individuals have a choice between rolling 
two six-faced dice or rolling  a single die with 12 faces. The problem is designed in order to 
make the two dice strategy stochastically dominated. The second experimental setting 
presents a more realistic economic choice, but in a more complex setting. Subjects have to 
choose between two real options with underlying activities which are more or less correlated. 
Once more, the option with less underlying variance is dominated by the other one. We show 
that  in both cases individuals fall prey to a diversification fallacy and choose the dominated 
action. 
We interpret this diversification fallacy as the result of the transfer of an “eggs in the basket” 
decision heuristic that is applied to an inappropriate domain. If this is true, there must be ways 
to present to subjects alternative sources of decision heuristics that induce more appropriate 
behavior. In order to do this, we have devised for each experimental setting a de-biasing 
treatment in which, while keeping constant the decision problem, contexts are evoked in 
which the rule of choosing the more variable option is more salient. The de-biasing treatments 
reflect the different nature of the two experiments. In the simpler dice decision setting we 
resort to a purely behavioral de-biasing treatment in which the same problem is framed in 
terms of a winner-take-all tournament – a context in which aggressive risk taking is a 
prevailing strategy (Fischbacher and Thöni, 2008). In the more complex real option 
experimental setting, we resort to a richer narrative structure, in which different stories similar 
in structure but different in domain are provided to subjects before they choose (a strategy 
often used in the psychological literature on analogical transfer).  Both de-biasing strategies 
are complementary, in that whereas the purely behavioral one avoids any intrusive 
manipulation of subjects representation of the problem, the narrative treatment allows for a 
more direct control of the content of the transfer. We find that both strategies induce 
equivalent results, effectively de-biasing subjects’ choices. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: In section 2.1 we introduce our experimental design. 
Section 2.2 and 2.3 present the results of the two baseline treatments, while section 2.4. 
presents the results of our de-biasing treatments. Section 3 discusses our results and their 
relations with theories of choice emphasizing the analogical transfer of choice rules. 
 
 
2. The experiments 
2.1 The experiments design 
 
We designed two experimental settings in which subjects have to make binary choices under  
risk. Our experiments are designed to reflect two main structural features. First, payoffs are 
convex. Second, the “diversification” option is stochastically dominated by its more 
“concentrated” alternative, so that optimal behavior is independent from risk attitudes. 
Keeping constant these features, the two settings are superficially very different. The first one 
presents a highly simplified choice among lotteries (under the very familiar cover of rolling 
dice). It doesn’t require any economic competence and thus is suited to test general cognitive 
processes. The second one is more complex and requires some economic competences to be 
understood, but represents a more realistic investment decision with a “real option” structure. 
Each experimental setting has two versions, the baseline and a de-biasing treatment. The de-
biasing treatment is introduced to show that bias in the baseline version is due to the 
inappropriate transfer of familiar decision rules. By making available different decision 
contexts in which more appropriate rules are available, we expect subjects to reverse their 
choice patterns. The de-biasing procedure differs in the two experimental settings, in 
consonance with the different semantic richness of the experimental settings.  In the first one, 
we follow a purely behavioral de-biasing procedure, by reproducing the rolling dice problem 
in a strategically equivalent tournament setting. In the second one, we follow the tradition in 
the experimental psychology of analogical transfer by providing subjects with set of stories 
(in apparently unrelated domains) which illustrate different decision heuristics.  
 
 
2.2 The first experimental task: rolling dice 
 
In our first two experiments subjects face the following task (see Appendix 1 for the 
instructions). 
Task 1a. Each subject has a choice between rolling two six-faced dice or a single die with 
twelve faces.  If the outcome is larger or equal to eight, the subject earns a Euro for each point 
scored (e.g. with two dice: 4+5=9, the subjects earns 9 euros). Otherwise she gets nothing.   
Despite its simplicity, the task deserves a few comments. If there was not a threshold at eight 
and the payoffs were proportional to all possible outcomes, rolling two dice would yield a 
more concentrated and less risky probability distribution of possible outcomes than rolling 
one die. Furthermore, in such a case rolling two dice would second order stochastically 
dominate rolling a single die (see Figure 1). Therefore every risk averse subject should prefer 
rolling two dice rather than a single one. The introduction of the threshold sharply modifies 
the attractiveness of the two options since in such a case the cumulative probability function 
of the outcomes of rolling one die lies always below the two dice’s one, therefore first order 
stochastically dominating it. All subjects, regardless their attitude toward risk, should prefer 
rolling a die. 
Figure 1. Rolling dice: the probability distribution of outcomes. 
 
   One die   Two dice 
Outcomes  Cumulative  Cumulative   
   Probabilities (F) Probabilities (G) ∑ −
i
ii xGxF )()(  
1   0.083   0.000   0.083 
2   0.167   0.028   0.222 
3   0.250   0.083   0.389 
4   0.333   0.167   0.556 
5   0.417   0.278   0.694 
6   0.500   0.417   0.778 
7   0.583   0.583   0.778 
8   0.667   0.722   0.722 
9   0.750   0.833   0.639 
10   0.833   0.917   0.556 
11   0.917   0.972   0.500 
12   1.000   1.000   0.500 
 
These features make this example a meaningful device to test the diversification fallacy of the 
“eggs in the basket” decision heuristic which, even if working well in the general case, would 
lead to the wrong decision when the threshold is not properly taken into consideration. 
We thus ran experiments 1 and 2, in which two different populations were facing task 1a. The 
first population (experiment 1) was composed of senior undergraduate students of economics 
or business. All subjects had already taken courses of basic economic decision making and at 
least one course in statistics. The second population (experiment 2) was composed of senior 
undergraduate students in architecture and in linguistics – no one of them with prior exposure 
to courses in economics and statistics. The experiments were run in a quiet room with small 
groups of subjects participating at each session.  Subjects could take all the time it needed to 
make a choice between rolling one 12-faces die or  two 6-faces dice in the task 1a. Subjects 
were left free to make calculations on paper if they wanted. After making their choice, 
subjects would actually roll a fair 12-face die or two fair 6-faces dice and  get a reward 
according to the rules above. 
 
Table 1. Experiments 1 and 2: Preferences between options. 
 
   N Option A  (rolling Option B (rolling p-value 
    2 dice)   1 die)   (bin. test, 
          one-tail) 
 
Experiment 1  84 60 (71.4%)  24 (28.6%)  0.015 
(skilled subjects) 
 
Experiment 2  22 19 ( 86.3%)  3 (13.7%)  0.000 
(unskilled subjects) 
* The p-value refers to the null hypothesis that subjects decide randomly. 
 
Table 1 reports the results of the experiments conduced using Task 1a, for both the skilled and 
unskilled populations. Most subjects clearly chose the “eggs in the basket” strategy, with no 
significant difference between the two experimental populations (despite the former training 
in statistics for the economics and business students).  
Such result can be compared with two behavioral benchmarks. The first one is the 
economically “correct” response: rational subjects should roll one die. The second one is  a 
kind of  “level-0” rationality behavior (Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Camerer et al., 2001): 
individuals unable to understand the structure of the problem might decide randomly. Our 
data show that the distribution of choices is significantly different from both optimal  and 
random behavior. Thus, subjects’ mistaken decisions reflect some systematic source of error. 
Despite their  very limited value as a source of data, post-experiment informal interviews tend 
to support the hypothesis of a kind of “diversification fallacy”. Interviews suggested that most 
subjects chose the two dice according to a variety of motivations predominantly driven by 
considerations such as “it is less risky to roll two dice” or even “if one die takes a low value it 
will be compensated by the other one” (which implies the illusion of some kind of negative 
correlation between the two dice, probably induced by “faith in the law of small  numbers”, 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1971).  
 
 
 
 
2.3 The second experimental task: a real option investment 
 
While Task 1a, due to its simplicity, allows to address the general impact of the “eggs in the 
basket heuristic” on decisions made by subjects (skilled or not), it lacks of economic realism. 
We proposed therefore another task featuring a real option investment case. 
Investing in options is an important example of convex revenue structure. A call/put option is 
a right to buy/sell a given quantity of an underlying asset at a given price (strike price) on or 
before a given date. The option grants a right to the holder, but does not impose an obligation: 
this asymmetry means that one must pay to acquire the right to buy/sell the asset. 
A call option holder will benefit from a possible rise above the strike price of the underlying 
asset without being affected by a possible fall below it, since in this case she can abandon the 
option avoiding its exercise. Thus, the holder of a call option will face a distribution of payoff 
truncated by the strike price: she gets only the right tail of the distribution since she will 
abandon the option when the underlying asset is below the strike price. Therefore, a rational 
subject, no matter if risk adverse, should be willing to pay ceteris paribus a higher premium 
for an option whose underlying asset has larger variance.  
TASK 2a. Subjects have to choose between  two investment  prospects: in each prospect, a 
broker sells a right (but not an obligation) to buy at the end of the year  two real estates.  The 
estates are owned by the same proprietor. Currently, there are temporary legal constraints that 
forbid constructing on such estates. However, the constraint will legally decay within one 
year. The right to buy is sold by the broker at the price of 50 experimental points. If the 
investor buys the option to acquire the estates, at the end of the year she will decide whether  
to jointly buy or not  the estates at a fixed price, corresponding to the current price at the 
moment of the broker’s proposal (300 experimental points). If she decides not to buy, she will 
lose the 50 points paid for the option right. If she decides to buy at the end of the year, she 
will be able to jointly resell the estates at their end of the year market value. In this case, her 
final profit will be given by the end of the year price of the estates minus 300 pts and minus 
the 50 points paid for the option right (see figure 2 and Appendix 2 for more details).  
In both prospects, the price of each estate at the end of the year has the same expected value 
and the same variance. The two alternative prospects offered by the broker differ only for one 
important detail. In one case (prospect A), the future prices of the estates are uncorrelated. In 
the other one (prospect B), they are strongly correlated (ρ= 0.8). Subjects are shown  
scatterplots  displaying the joint distribution of the prices at the end of the year for each 
option. Subjects are informed that the price will be actually drawn from such distributions on 
a computerized random generating device. At the end of the experiment, one experimental 
point will be converted in 0.1 euros. 
Clearly, both prospects represent conventional call options. However, uncertainty is 
represented by the joint distributions of future prices, thus emphasizing their correlation, 
instead of using a single synthetic indicator of volatility, as usual. As outlined in Appendix 3, 
the returns of both prospects are normally distributed with the same mean but different 
variance. It follows that it is always better to invest in the not-diversified prospect, 
independently of the individual risk attitudes (Black and Scholes, 1973). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. about here 
 
Table 2 reports the results of the experiments conduced using Task 2a, for both the economics 
and non-economics populations. In experiment 3 subjects were 33 third-year undergraduate 
students with a major in economics or business at the University of Venezia. All of them had 
taken at least one course in statistics, and had been exposed in many courses to fundamentals 
of economic decision making. Most subjects chose the “diversified” option, with no 
correlation between the prices of the two estates. Remarkably, a chi square test demonstrates 
that the distribution of choices is not statistically distinguishable from that one of the 
analogue population in the rolling dice task in experiment 1. 
In experiment 4 subjects were 64 University students of Venice with a major in science or in 
architecture, without any particular background in economics. The choices were almost 
evenly split between the two alternatives. Post-experiment informal  interviews suggest that 
this behavior is not due to a better understanding of the problem by subjects not trained in  
economics, but rather by the difficulty for subjects to understand the task. This is 
understandable since real options have a complex structure which is often opaque also to well 
trained managers and investors (Howell and Jagle, 1997; Lander and Pinches, 1998).  
A plausible interpretation of this result is that  decision makers with an economic background 
recognize the task as similar to already known decision problems and, ignoring the effect of 
payoff convexity, import a diversification heuristic well established in their education, 
therefore confirming that sometimes no knowledge can be better than little or superficial 
knowledge. 
 
Table 2. Experiments 3 and 4: Preferences between options. 
  N Option A  (no  Option B (strong p-value 
   correlation)  correlation)  (binomial test, one-
         tail)* 
 
Experiment 3 33 22 (66.7%)  11 (33.3%)  0.041 
(skilled 
 subjects) 
 
Experiment 4 64 31 (48.4%)  33 (51.6%)  0.45 
(unskilled  
subjects) 
* p-value based on the null hypothesis that subjects decide randomly. 
 
 
 
2.4 The de-biasing treatment 
2.4.1 The de-biasing design 
The previous results raise questions about the mechanisms causing the diversification fallacy 
and generating systematic error. Our conjecture is that subjects may inappropriately transfer 
decision making strategies that turned out to be successful in similar domains, as suggested by 
case-based decision making theory (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1995) and by psychological 
theories of analogical inference (Holyoak and Thagard, 1995; see also Knez and Camerer, 
2000 and Devetag, 2005 for some experimental evidence related to game playing).  
Psychological experiments on analogy making resort predominantly to story-reading to 
explore how analogy works. Subjects are provided with stories which, although belonging to 
different domains, could indirectly suggest some particular course of action. We followed this 
approach in the real option investment experiments, while in the rolling dice ones we 
preferred to introduce a less invasive form of de-biasing than the case-reading procedure. The 
description of the latter task is so simple that a story reading could be interpreted by subjects 
as a direct hint for the right answer. Therefore we introduced an experimental treatment in 
which alternatives to the diversification heuristic are made available by the task itself, rather 
than implied by a narrative. 
 
 
2.4.2 Rolling dice 
We transformed task 1a in a simple winner-take-all tournament. 
TASK 1b. Each subject is part of a group of 4 randomly paired subjects. Each subject 
submits a choice between rolling two six-faced dice or a single die with twelve faces. Her 
choice is unknown to other players until all choices are made. Subsequently, each player rolls 
one or two dice according to her previous choice. Among those players who will have 
obtained an outcome equal or larger than 8, the one with the largest outcome will earn 15 
euros. Other players will earn nothing. If there is a tie, a random tie-breaking rule will be 
applied. If no one gets a score equal or larger than 8, no one earns any reward.  
As for task 1a, also in this case it is stochastically dominant to roll a single 12-faces die. From 
this point of view, task 1b is equivalent to task 1a. However, the experimental literature on 
winner-take-all games shows that subjects tend to behave more aggressively and to take more 
risk in such conditions (Fischbacher and Thoni, 2008). We thus expected that the tournament 
frame would make available to many subjects an alternative heuristic, suggesting to take more 
risk and possibly put all eggs in a same basket.  
We performed experiment 5 using task 1b with a population of senior undergraduate students 
of economics or business, to make it comparable with experiment 1. In order to test whether 
the de-biasing treatment modified the preferences found in the previous corresponding 
experiments we report a chi-square test showing a significant effect of the tournament 
treatment, that reduces the relative frequency of  the “diversification” choice.  
 
Table 3. Experiment 5: preferences between options. 
 
 N   Option A  Option B Chi-square test 
    (rolling 2 dice)  (rolling 1 die) (p-value) 
 
40 (skilled subjects)  16 (40 %)  24 (60%) 0.001 
 
The chi-square tests whether differences with the distribution in experiment 1 are significant. 
 
2.4.3 The real option investment 
In this case we followed a consolidated tradition in the psychological experimental literature 
on analogy making (Holyoak and Thagard, 1995) and provided subjects with additional cases 
supporting the “eggs in the basket” heuristic or instead supporting concentration of risks. We 
expected subjects to react to the exposure to such cases by modifying their choice behavior 
according to the cases provided to them.  
Following the same experimental psychology tradition, we designed cases from domains 
relatively remote from the target domain of economic investment. This makes the transfer 
much less obvious and thus limits the risk that reading cases is perceived by subjects as 
reading instructions on how to behave in the experiment. 
Task 2b presents the same investment problem of task 2a. However, before choosing, subjects 
had to read two cases of decision making in a different domain (military decision making) 
presenting structural similarities with the investment problem they were facing. There were 
two experimental groups,  and each group had a set of two stories, one concerning risk taking 
and the second one concerning diversification strategies (see Box 1, below references). While 
the “risk taking” story (henceforth: case 2) was the same for both experimental groups, the 
“diversification” story was different for the two groups (henceforth: cases 1a and 1b). In one 
case (1a), the story reported a successful use of a risk concentrating strategy; in the other one 
(1b), the story reported a successful use of the “eggs in the basket” heuristic.  The “risk 
taking” and the “diversification” cases reported similar  (positive) outcomes of the decisions 
made. However, they differed in the degree of similarity with the  target investment decision.  
In particular, we conjectured that the “diversification” stories were more similar to the target 
problem, and thus should affect predominantly subjects’ final decisions. 
We validated our conjecture concerning the relative similarity of each case to the target 
decision by using two independent groups of subjects (students of Economics or Business of 
the University of Venezia, paid according to a fix show-up fee of 4 euros). Each subject in 
group A read cases 1a and 2 and the target decision, and had to choose the case more similar 
to the target decision.  Similarly, each subject in group B read cases 1b and 2 and the target 
decision, and had  to choose the case more similar to the target decision. 
Table 4 reports the results of such preliminary experiment, clearly demonstrating that most 
subjects found cases 1a and 1b relatively more similar than case 2 to the target decision. 
 
Table 4. Similarities between cases and target problem. 
  N Case 1 is chosen as more similar to the  p-value 
   target problem  than Case 2   (binomial test, one- 
         tail) 
 
Cases 1a, 2 16   12     0.038 
Cases 1b, 2 16   14     0.002 
Legend: case 1a supports the “eggs in the basket” heuristic, case 1b supports concentration 
(see box 1). 
 
Once this was established, we performed experiment 6 and 7 using task 2b (with a new pool 
of experimental subjects, once more students of Economics at the University of Venezia, paid 
as in Experiments 3 and 4). Our conjecture was that subjects reading cases 1a and 2 
(experiment 6) would be more prey to the diversification fallacy than subjects reading cases 
1b and 2 (experiment 7).  
 
Table 5. Experiment 6 and 7: preferences between options. 
 
  N Option A (no   Option B (strong Chi-square 
   correlation)   correlation)  test p-value 
 
Experiment 6 32 19 (59.4%)   13 (40.6%)  0.540 
Cases 1a, 2 
 
Experiment 7 36 11 (30.6%)   25 (69.4%)  0.003 
Cases 1b, 2 
Legend: case 1a supports diversification, case 1b supports concentration of risks (see box 1). 
The chi-square tests whether differences with the distribution in experiment 3 are significant. 
Table 5 shows the results of experiments 6 and 7. As predicted, there was a neat reversal in 
the modal outcome according to the pair of stories provided to subjects. The results clearly 
support our conjecture: a one-tailed Chi-Square test yields a significant difference between 
the two experimental treatments. Furthermore, the outcomes of the case 1a and 2 treatment 
are not statistically distinguishable from those of experiment 3. 
Remarkably, the distribution of choices in experiment 7 is not distinguishable (the chi-square 
lends a p-value = 0.737) from that one in the tournament treatment (experiment 5) confirming 
the equivalence of both the de-biasing treatments here proposed. 
 
 
3. Discussion 
Our experiments demonstrate that subjects tend to diversify when it should not be the case, a 
behavior opposite to the “underdiversification” observed in many empirical works on 
portfolio and asset allocation choices (Blume and Friend, 1975; Dorn and Huberman, 2005; 
Polkovnichenko, 2005).  
The diversification fallacy we point to should not be confused with other biases related to 
diversification phenomena recently highlighted in the literature. The concept of a 
“diversification heuristic” has been introduced (Simonson, 1990; Read and Lowenstein, 1995) 
to describe variety-seeking behavior when decisions are made in one shot rather than in 
different moments of time. This is clearly different from the fallacy described in this paper, 
which is unrelated to the timing of decisions. A second diversification bias has been observed 
in terms of an evenly dividing investments among available alternatives, labeled the “1/n 
heuristic” by Benartzi and Thaler (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001). This is once more different 
from what we observe, since our experiments focus on the choice between two alternatives 
(one more “diversified” than the other), not on the proportional allocation within a given 
menu of choice. More generally, it has been observed that diversification behavior often 
neglects the portfolio’s covariation structure (Kroll et al., 1988, Siebenmorgen and Weber, 
2003, Dorn and Huberman, 2007). Instead, we observe that individuals may use information 
on covariation in biased ways. 
We found the diversification fallacy occurs when the payoff structure is convex, reproducing 
the asymmetry around a threshold point typical of the option-like prospects. Options have a 
cognitively complex structure and it has already been shown that especially real options may 
be opaque to investors and managers (Howell and Jagle, 1997, Lander and Pinches, 1998). 
Subjects not recognizing that the option structure cuts the negative effects of downward 
outcomes could be the typical prey of the diversification fallacy.  
Our results suggest also why the diversification fallacy does occur. They clearly point to the 
fact that subjects transfer (inappropriate) decision rules from domains in which they have 
learned to apply such rules. The possibility to recognize such source domains is crucial: the 
experiments on the real option choice show that an expert subject, who can understand the 
task and reconduce it to a familiar decision problem, is more likely to be biased than an 
inexperienced one, who in the absence of familiarities cues behaves in a substantially random 
way. In particular, our debiasing procedures show the important role played by the context (a 
tournament vs. an individual bet) and the availability of similar cases (the military stories) in 
triggering a specific decision. This lends support to theories of choice that emphasize  the 
transfer of rules and the analogical nature of human decision making (Gigerenzer and Todd, 
1999). The example of the military stories further establishes that when multiple sources are 
available and may suggest different decision strategies, similarity with the target problem at 
hand determines which one will be used, a point clearly consonant with the case-based theory 
of decision making (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1995). 
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Box 1: the set of stories. 
 
Case 1a 
Major Smith had to attack a fortified town: 
the defendants were less than Smith’s troops 
but the fortification balanced the forces. The 
fortification had two weak points and Smith 
thought to resort to a surprise attack to these 
points. Many troops were necessary to break 
these points. 
Major Smith thought there were two ways to 
conduce the mission: 
1. to try an heavy attack in one point. If 
the surprise-effect would have been 
effective Smith’s troops could take 
the town easily. Otherwise the attack 
would had been very difficult; 
2. to split the forces in both points. In 
such a case, the most probable 
outcome was a mixed one: in one 
point the surprise was effective, 
while in the other one it wasn’t. 
Smith could anyway take the town 
without too many losses, 
concentrated mainly in the point 
where the surprise was not effective. 
Smith chose the second option because 
concentrating the troops was a high risk 
choice with an outcome alternatively very 
good or very bad. By splitting the forces 
Smith had a higher probability to take the 
town with acceptable losses: so Smith chose 
the “not all the eggs in a basket” strategy. 
Smith succeeded in his mission and casualties 
in his troops were 15. 
 
Case 1b 
Major Smith, the commander of a storm 
troops battalion, had to plan a sabotage to an 
important enemy base. A successful sabotage 
would made possible the attack by the army.  
Smith decided that some saboteurs would 
creep into the base to find out its weak points 
and sabotage them. Straight after having 
damaged the operations of the base, the army 
would have attacked it heavily. 
Major Smith thought there were two ways to 
conduce the mission: 
1. to split the forces, sending a storm 
troop in each entry point of the base. 
The probability that one the troops 
could creep into the base and find out 
some weak points was quite high. 
However the small number of 
soldiers in each troop lowered the 
possibility to damage seriously the 
base. As a consequence, the attack by 
the army would have been more 
difficult; 
2. to concentrate the troops in only one 
entry point. In such a case, if the 
troops could find out a weak point 
the joint action of the troops would 
have damaged seriously the base, 
making easier the attack by the army. 
Major Smith chose the second option because 
the mission put at risk only the troops 
directly involved in it while the potential 
benefit was very high only if the base would 
have been seriously damaged. In other words, 
Smith came to the conclusion that, contrary 
to common sense, in such situations “putting 
all the eggs in a basket” was the best choice. 
Smith succeeded in his mission and 
casualties  in his troops were 15. 
Case 2 
Major Smith had to bring reinforcements to a battalion defending a strategic position in an 
impervious place. He could reach the place through two ways: the first way (the “risky way”) 
was short but it exposed Smith’s troops to a high ambush danger. The second way (the 
“riskless way”) was longer but it did not expose Smith’s troops to a high danger. 
Smith had to decide what way to go through. It was important to reach early the defending 
battalion to avoid the risk the enemy forces captured the strategic position. He estimated that 
going through the riskless way he could almost surely reach the battle place in about a day. 
On the other hand, going through the risky way he could reach it in half a day, but in case of 
an ambush the time would be quite longer than a day. 
Smith chose the riskless way. Smith succeeded in his mission and casualties in his troops 
were 15. 
APPENDIX 1 
 
TASK 1a 
 
You are going to participate to an experiment in which you will be rolling dice. If the 
outcome is larger or equal to eight, you will earn a Euro for each point scored. Otherwise you 
will get nothing. 
You have to choose one the two following options: 
A) You roll two six-faced fair dice. Your score will be the sum of the score of each die. 
B) You roll a single fair die with twelve faces.  
Which option do you choose? 
 
APPENDIX 2 
 
TASK 2a 
 
A real estate broker proposes the following deal. 
There are two estates owned by the same proprietor: currently, there are temporary legal 
constraints that forbid constructing on such estates. However, the constraint will legally decay 
within one year. The current price of each of these estates, if it were immediately suitable for 
building, would be 150 points, summing up to 300 for both. 
The owner wants to sell both at the end of the year. 
If you pay now 50 points you have the right, but not the obligation, to buy together the two 
estates (i.e. you can buy both or none) at the end of the year, paying a price of 300 points. Of 
course, you will buy the estates only if their aggregate price will be more than 300: in such a 
case you will sell them to a real estate investment trust, obtaining: 
Market price – 300 – 50 
It is worth buying even if the market price, while being more than 300, is less than 350: you 
will suffer a net loss, but you will recover at least part of the initial cost of 50. 
If the market price will be less than 300 you will not buy the estates: in such a case you will 
lose 50. 
The broker proposes two prospects you have to choose between. In both cases you must pay 
now 50 and the current price of the estates is the same (150 + 150). 
 
PROSPECT A 
 
The two estates are very different and in far away regions. Therefore, their prices are 
independent (the correlation is about 0), since they are affected by very different factors. For 
instance, if the first estate’s price goes up you can’t say it is more probable the other estate’s 
price goes up nor it goes down. 
 
 
PROSPECT B 
 
The two estates are similar and in the same region. Therefore, their prices are strongly 
correlated (the correlation is about 0.8), since they are affected by several common factors. 
For instance, if the first estate’s price goes up is very likely that the other estate’s price goes 
up as well (the contrary if the price goes down). 
 
 
PAYOFF 
 
The end of the year prices of the estates will be simulated using the probability distribution 
underlying the scatterplots in figure 3. It is worth noting that the price volatility is the same 
for all the estates. When the prices are correlated (prospect B) the prices are fixed 
accordingly. 
Your payoff will be settled by the simulated prices. 
 
Fig. 3 about here  
 
 
APPENDIX 3 
 
The simulation procedure 
 
The prices and the figures used in the Task 1 have been computed using the following model 
of expected percentage returns of estates in each prospect: 
Return (Estatei) = βF + εi 
where β is a parameter, while F and εi are variables normally and independently distributed. 
While F represents a common factor for both estates in each prospect, with mean 0.05 and 
variance 0.2, εi represents an idyosincratic factor.  
In Prospect A the value of the parameter β is 0, while the mean and variance of each 
idiosyncratic factor are 0.05 and 0.25 respectively. In Prospect B the value of the parameter β 
is 1, while the mean and variance of each idiosyncratic factor are 0 and 0.05 respectively. 
It follows that: 
- the mean and variance of the returns are the same for all estates (0.05 and 0.25); 
- in Prospect A the theoretical correlation between estates is 0 and the distribution of portfolio 
return is N(0.05, 0.125); 
- in Prospect B the theoretical correlation between estates is 0.8 and the distribution of 
portfolio return is N(0.05, 0.225). 
 
 
 
 
 
